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Abstract
This paper investigates the link between export survival of agri-food products
and nancial development. Our hypothesis is that nancial developement dif-
ferentially a¤ects the survival of exports across products based on their need of
external nance. We propose a test for the role of nancial development by ex-
amining whether exports of products that are relatively more reliant on external
capital survive longer when initiated in more nancially developped countries. Our
results suggest that agri-food products that require more external nance indeed
sustain longer in foreign markets when exported from more nancially developed
countries.
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1 Introduction
Surviving in the export market is not just about entering into, but also about not
exiting from foreign markets. The rapidly growing literature on international trade
at the level of individual rms has mainly focused on the role of xed costs and rms
characteristicsproductivity and nancial constraintson exporting status (Melitz, 2003,
Eaton et al., 2004; Bernard and Jensen, 2004; Chaney, 2005; Manova, 2008, Eaton et al.,
2009). Yet, empirical evidence on the relevance of these determinants on rmsability
to sustain once they entered is rather scarce. This is surprising given that sustained
trade relationships are the driving force of rmsexport performances and subsequent
economic growth (Besedes and Prusa, 2006a; Brenton and Newfarmer, 2007; Brenton et
al., 2009). In countries as di¤erent as Columbia or China, higher export performances
are to be expected from the securing (survival) and deepening of existing trade ows
rather than the creation of new ones (Eaton et al., 2008; Manova and Zhang, 2009).
In this paper we try to ll this void of the literature and investigate the role of
nancial development in promoting export survival of agri-food export sensitive to food
safety regulations of destination markets. The focus on the agri-food sector is dictated
by the availability of a measure of nancing needs at the product level. We rely on a
measure of product sanitary risk developed by Jaud et al., (2009a). Additionally, the
agri-food sector is particularly relevant to developing countries. International trade in
high-value food productsincluding fresh and processed fruits and vegetables, sh, live
animals and meat, nuts, and spicesfrom developing countries has expanded enormously
over the last two decades o¤ering opportunities for development. However, trade in agri-
food is governed by a growing array of standards. Evolving Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Standards (SPS) and technical regulations as well as changes in importers supply chain
requirements impose additional sunk, xed and operating costs along the rmsexport
life. These costs may not only a¤ect the decision of rms to start exporting but also
a¤ect survival of the rms pricing outproducers that cannot comply with the SPS
regulations.
The existence of these costs suggests a potential role of credit constraints in shaping
the duration of trade relationships on foreign markets. Well-developed nancial mar-
kets by facilitating rms access to nance would allow them to survive demand shocks
in foreign markets and maintain long-standing trade relationships. The more so for
products with higher nancing needs. We empirically test this prediction by examining
the export survival of di¤erent agri-food products from rms operating in ve African
countries to the world. We build on the seminal work of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and
use a di¤erence in di¤erences approach. To capture the di¤erentiated e¤ect of nancial
development across industries, they interact the country level of nancial development
with the industry level of external nance dependence and control for industry and
country xed e¤ects. The measure of external nance dependence is computed using
US rm level data and reects the industry technological demand for external nance.
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As a proxy for nancing needs of agri-food products, a measure of sanitary risk computed
at the 8-digit level of the HS classication (Jaud et al., 2009a). The Sanitary Risk
Index (SRI) reects the propensity of products to fail health and safety controls on the
European Union (EU) market. Thus, it captures the need for investments to comply with
the EU food safety requirements. Several studies in the standard and trade literature,
suggest high costs of compliance, both variable and xed, for rms exporting high-
value food products (Garcia-Martinez and Poole, 2006; Maskus et al., 2005). Our
proxy captures the need for nancing associated with exporting to stringent developed
countries market. Since our focus is on African rms ability to sustain in the export
markets, capturing the di¤erentiated e¤ect of nancial development requires an export
based measure rather than production based measure.
The paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, it contributes to a liter-
ature on credit constraints and patterns of trade. This rapidly growing line of research
highlights the role of nance for credit constrained rms to fund both short term and
longer term needs. A number of papers have provided evidence on the positive e¤ect
of the supply of external nance to rms on trade performances (Manova, 2008; Beck,
2003; Svaleryd and Vlachos 2005; Berman and Hericourt forth, Bugamelli et al. 2008;
Görg and Spaliara 2009). More recently, several papers have looked into the e¤ects of
liquidity shortages following banking crisis on the performances of rms already engaged
in exporting (Amiti and Weinstein, 2010; Bricogne et al., 2010). Crucially, the nega-
tive e¤ects of credit constraints vary with the industry dependence on external nance
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Finance helps especially exports of those rms with needs
for greater external capital. An innovation of our paper with respect to the previous
related literature is its reliance on the index of sanitary risk to capture the need for -
nancing of agri-food rms to support their exports to high income destination markets.
Additionally, we address the issue of export survival. The existing literature on nance
and trade usually focuses on the short-term year-to-year changes in the export status
of products or rms (Manova 2008, Berman and Héricourt forth). An exception is the
recent paper of Jaud et al. (2009b), who show that nancial development promotes
export survival for nancially vulnerable industries requiring a higher external nancing
to maintain their operations. Relying on the tools of survival analysis arguably enables
us to better capture the medium and long run survival of exporters. This distinction is
not innocuous. The majority of export relationships die within two years and the bulk
of export growth in successful developing countries comes from the long-term survivors.
Second, it contributes to the burgeoning trade literature using survival analysis (Besedes
and Prusa 2006a, 2006b; Nitsch, 2009; Brenton et al., 2009). The literature has so far
examined how di¤erent country characteristics contribute to longer survival of domestic
rms on foreign markets. The main problems of using country characteristics as regres-
sors are the potential endogeneity and omitted variables bias. When trying to identify
the causal e¤ect of nancial development, it is impossible to control for all other coun-
try characteristics that are correlated with nance and also might a¤ect the survival
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of exporting rms. We address this issue by incorporating the methodology of Rajan
and Zingales (1998) into the framework of survival analysis. This enables us to look for
a specic channel through which nancial development promotes export survival while
controlling for country, rm and product xed e¤ects.
Third, we contribute to the food safety standards and trade literature. Most of the works
have focused on the quantitative assessment of the e¤ects of standards on trade essen-
tially by including standardscount of noticationsas explanatory variables in gravity
equations (Otsuki et al. 2001, Moenius 2006, Disdier et al. 2008). We distinguish
ourselves from this literature relying on an innovative measure of product sanitary risk.
Our measure captures the need at the product level for nance to comply with the food
safety regulation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briey dis-
cusses some key features of the data that motivated our empirical framework. Section
3 introduces the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents our African rm-level data and
gives some descriptive statistics. Section 5 reports the main estimation results. Section
6 shows some robustness checks. And nally, section 7 concludes.
2 Motivation
2.1 Access to Finance and Trade Duration
The theoretical literature shapes a role for nance on trade mainly at the time of entry,
when access to nancing is the most critical (Das et al., 2007; Berman and Hericourt
forth). The prominence of rms entry and subsequent exit from export markets suggests
that initial entry costs are not as high as theoretical models predict. The high proportion
of failures in trade relationships, past the rst two years of exporting, can be explained
by the high costs of sustaining in the export market (Besedes 2007). This calls for a
role of access to nance along the life of trade relationships. Long lasting trade relations
depend on a well-functioning nancial system both in the origin and destination country.
In 2006, the average ratio of private credit to GDP was 110 percent in the OECD, 31
percent in Latin Americanotoriously under-bankedand only 20 percent in Africa. The
latter is most certainly biased upwards since a large number of African countries do
not report any data. Additionally, the majority of rms located in these ve countries
are small and medium sized rms, for which the lack of technical qualications and
necessary capital investments constrain their ability to remain and expand on foreign
export markets.
We use rm-level survey data to further show the relevance of access to nance for rms
export survival.1 We use answers from surveyed exporters in Ghana, Mali, Malawi,
1The survey data 100 responding companiesserves as anecdotal evidence. It highlights the im-
portance of access to nance for exporting activity. It is by no means a representative sample of all
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Senegal and Tanzania. The data comes from the World Bank International Trade De-
partment. In each country around 100 rms provided answers to the questions. The
questions are designed such that each rm can give multiple answers to each of the
questions. Therefore percentage do not add up to 100. The rst question investigates
what are the main supply constraints to the expansion of the company exports. Among
current exporters one answer largely dominates. 34% of current exporters cite the lack
of nance as a main obstacle for the expansion of the company production to the larger
scale. And 34% of current exporters cite the lack of nance as a main obstacle for im-
proving the quality of the companys products. Among past exportersthat at the time
of the interview had ceased activities47% cite the lack of nance as a main obstacle
for surviving in the exporting activity. The second question further considers the costs
relating to exporting as potential constraints to the company sales expansion abroad.
Once more, the answer that dominated among companies operating in agriculture is
the costs related to complying with SPS regulation (25% of the respondents). These
results highlight the large dependency of rms on external nance to support both their
working capital and longer term investment needs.
2.2 Standards, Cost of Compliance and Trade Duration
In recent years, developing countries exports in high-value food products to developed-
country markets have expanded considerably in response to changing consumer tastes
and with the support of advances in production, transport, and other supply chain
technologies. Characterized by relatively high income elasticities of demand and lower
price volatility than many traditional developing country export commodities, high-
value food products have emerged as a potentially major source of export growth for
many African countries. Still, trade in such products is governed by a growing array of
standards. Not only are food standards stringent, they are increasingly so. Standards
relate to the products themselves and to the processes by which they are produced and
handled.
To enter foreign markets African agri-food exports have to satisfy both stringent public
and private standards. The EU being the main destination for sub-Saharan African agri-
cultural exports (see Appendix 8:A), the EU legislation remains of primary importance
to these countries. The EU new comprehensive food safety policy (EC R 178/2002)
involves the adoption of an integrated approach covering all aspects of the food chain.
Traceability implies that EU food companies have to document from/to whom they
are buying/selling produce such that products can be traced back to their origin in
case of food safety problems. While, they are limited to a one step forward, one step
backprinciple within the EU, with no obligations to keep records in third countries, in
practise, however, EU buyers are going beyond the strict legal requirements. Complete
African rms.
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traceability throughout the chain up to the level of overseas producers forms parts of
many private standards, including the GlobalGAP.
As a result, exporting adequate quality products requires producers to invest in produc-
tion infrastructure, revise their practises through sta¤ training and implement traceabil-
ity systems. A signicant body of literature provides evidence that these compliance
costs are non trivial and may be su¢ cient to disrupt rms trade relationships. Maskus
et al., (2005) use rm-level data from 16 developing countries in the World Bank Tech-
nical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Survey Database. Their ndings indicate that standards
do increase short-run production costs by requiring additional inputs of labor and cap-
ital. They show that a one percent increase in investment to meet compliance costs in
importing countries raises variable production costs by between 0.06 and 0.13 percent
in the exporting country. Additionally, they nd that the xed costs of compliance are
signicant and amount approximately $425,000 per rm, or about 4.7 percent of value
added on average. Other attempts to quantify the compliance costs include the recent
study by UNCTAD (2005). The costs of compliance with SPS for tropical fruits in three
sub-Saharan African countriesincluding United Republic of Tanzania, Mozambique and
Guineaare estimated using the GlobalGAP protocol as a case study2. Appendix 8:B
reports results for Tanzania. These ndings illustrate the importance of both recurring
operating and xed investment costs, suggesting that compliance is both a costly and
lengthy process. While these costs may be born publicly, in practise, the lack of tech-
nical and administrative capacities in developing countries implies that the cost burden
fall onto individual rms. Their ability to secure su¢ cient liquidity to insure ongoing
production as well as to make the necessary investments is essential to their protably
remaining on the market. In this manner, the relative under-development of nancial
systems in sub-Saharan African countries may constrain rms access to capital and sub-
sequent export survival. The next two sections present our choice of empirical strategy
and the data.
3 Empirical Strategy
Our hypothesis is that nancial development di¤erentially a¤ects the survival of exports
across products based on their sensitivity to SPS regulations. A measure of sanitary
risk at the product level (Jaud et al., 2009a) serves as a proxy for nancing needs of
agri-food products.
This di¤erential e¤ect calls for a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach initially proposed
by Rajan and Zingales (1998). Their seminal paper emphasizes the benecial implica-
tions of nancial development for industries dependent on external nance. To capture
2The GlobalGAP was designed to accommodate the requirements set out by international standards
as well as EU regulations. For these reasons, it is a good proxy to estimate the necessary costs of
complying with standards and providing safe non rejected products.
6
the di¤erential e¤ect of nancial development across industries, they interact the coun-
try level of nancial development with the industry level of external nance dependence
and control for industry and country xed e¤ects. This allows to isolate the impact of
nancial development on industry growth after controlling for cross-country and within-
country di¤erences as well as omitted variable bias. Industry-level measures of external
capital dependence are based on U.S. rms nancial data. The indicator of a sectors
reliance on outside nance is dened as the ratio of capital expenditures minus cash
ow from operations to capital expenditures for the median rm in each industry taking
the average across years. Thus, the measure of external nance dependence captures
technological demand for nancing for each industry and is assumed to be similar across
countries.
The paper relies on the Rajan and Zingales estimation strategy to isolate a channel
through which nancial development may promote export survival. We do not build
on Rajan and Zingales to compute our risk measure. Crucially, our proxy for nancing
needs of agri-food products is a measure of their sanitary risk. It is an export based
rather than a production based measure, computed using rejections of exports at the
EU borders. Thus, our proxy captures the need for nancing associated with exporting
to stringent developed countries market. Since our focus is on African rms ability to
sustain in the export markets, capturing the di¤erentiated e¤ect of nancial development
requires an export based measure of nancing needs.
3.1 The Sanitary Risk Index
This section details the construction of the Sanitary Risk Index, and motivates its use as
a measure of nancing needs at the product level. The risk index is computed using data
from the EU Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF). The RASFF database
reports all agri-food shipments to the EU between 2001 and 2008, that have su¤ered
rejection due to food safety reasons. The database provides rejections by product,
exporting country, importing country (EU member state) and year. The index is the
coe¢ cient on the product dummy, k in the following regression:
Alertck = f(ImpShare
EU
ck + Controlsk + c + k+ "ck) (1)
where "ck is an error term. For a product k and an exporter c, the dependent variable
is the combined count of notications from all EU member states between 2001 and
20083. The unit of observation is an exporter  product pair and the regression is cross-
sectional. To avoid picking up on any particularities generated by exporting countries
3There is indeed, consistent di¤erences in the number of notications among notifying EU states. In
an average year, Germany with 20% of notications is among the top notifying countries, while Ireland
only account of 0.21% of notications. Aggregating the number of notications across all importing
(notifying) countries and all years, smooths temporal uctuations and reduces the e¤ects of outliers.
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exports volume, protectionist agenda or limited competition a set of control variables are
included: exporter c share in EU imports of product k in the year 2000 (one year before
the sample start) (Imp_shareEUck ), the ad-valorem equivalent of the EUs MFN tari¤
on product k; (tariffk)4, a dummy variable indicating whether product k is a¤ected
by a quota during the sample period (quotak), a dummy variable indicating whether
product k has been the object of a dispute at the WTO between the EU and any
other country (disputek). Including a dummy variable indicating whether exporter c
is a¤ected by a ban on product k during the sample period controls for decreases in
the incidence of notications resulting from reduced imports rather than reduced risk
(banck). The initial value of EU imports of product k in the year 2000 (totimport2000k ) is
included, as products imported in large volumes are likely to be inspectedand therefore,
fail inspectionsmore often than others. Finally, the inclusion of a country xed e¤ect
c; controls for all suppliers characteristics that may a¤ect the quality of the product
including overall economic development.5 Because the number of notications is a count,
estimation is by Negative Binomialalternatively Poisson.6
In this set up, the product dummy captures the share of alerts due to product char-
acteristics after controlling for exporterscharacteristics and other variables that may
a¤ect the probability of being rejected. A high risk index reects a high sensitivity to
food safety regulations. Since, rejection occurs when a product does not comply with
food safety requirements as set in the regulation, the index can be interpreted as the
gap between standard and actual product quality. "Risky" products are products far
away from the standard. The gap deepens if the regulation is changing and/or if cur-
rent production technologies do not allow to reach adequate quality. As a consequence,
laying far away from the standard, leaves rms with two options, either conform or drop
the market. As shown in section 2.2, compliance is a lengthy and costly process. Thus,
for complying rms, the risk index captures the need for capital to conform with EU
markets food safety requirements, and acts as a proxy for product nancing needs. In
the remainder of the paper we refer to our measure of nancing needs as the risk index.
Here, risk should be understood as the risk of su¤ering alerts.
We now briey discuss some important features of the index. First, to our knowledge,
there is no available measure of nancing needs at the product level7. As explained in
4We take tari¤s data for the year 2005.
5Even though we control for a potential protectionist agenda of the destination markets and for the
exporting country time invariant characteristics, our index may still su¤er from omitted variable bias.
The limited time span of our data on alerts does not allow us to estimate the risk index controlling for
time invariant sectorial characteristics specic to the exporting country.
6A Poisson would give similar results, as the consistency of second-stage estimates does not depend
on the correct specication of the rst-stage equation. In addition, we have over dispersion and little
excess of zeros in the sample. The negative binomial is to a reasonable extent adequate in tackling both
problems. However estimation using zero-inated negative binomial could be a good alternative.
7In Bricogne et al. (2010), the authors compute an external nance dependence measure akin to
Rajan and Zingales (1998) at the HS2-digit level.
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details above, the number of alerts per se, as a measure of nancing needs, is a very
noisy proxy capturing both product and country characteristics. In a similar manner,
the occurrence of notications at the product levelcount of existing SPS regulationsis
poorly informative. It is an ex-ante measure, that does not reect how the regulations
are being managed in practise. By contrast, we consider the e¤ective product risk
based on real food alerts at the EU border. The risk index measures how food safety
regulations translate into inspections and rejections of non compliant shipments and thus
how costly it may be to comply. In addition, no data on the costs of compliance at the
product level, which would be the best proxy for capital needs, is available (section 2:2).
The correlations between our risk index and those alternative measures are reported in
Appendix 8:C. All coe¢ cients are below 0.35. The correlation between the number of
public SPS notications and the measure of sanitary risk is low. However this may be
explained by the fact that the number of notications is taken from Disdier et al., (2008)
and is computed at the HS6 level, while our measure of risk is computed at the HS8
level. In addition, a lot of products have at least one notication, while few products
have a positive SRI.
Second, it is worth noting that our measure of risk, and therefore the need for nancing,
is time invariant. Most probably this will not be the case in practise. However we verify
that the ranking of agri-food sectors based on rejection occurrences is persistent over
time8.
Finally, we ask the question whether the risk index computed using the EU market food
safety requirements as a benchmark is relevant? The focus of the analysis is on public
standards since the food alert database only reports shipments non compliant with the
EU food safety regulation, and due to data limitations it was not possible to account
for private standards in the empirical analysis. Private protocols play an increasingly
important role in the governance of food supply chains. Public standards are becoming
more performance and process based, they are developed to correct market failures,
and therefore, tend to play a dominant role in preventing fraud and ensuring minimum
standards for largely homogenous agricultural products. While, in many cases private
standards build on the existing public standard infrastructure to provide an element of
competition through quality di¤erentiation, as well as to facilitate e¤ective coordination
in supply chains. Thus, a large share of the cost of compliance arise because of public
regulations. Our risk measure while not accounting for private standard still captures
the need for nancing to maintain access to developed countriesmarket. In addition,
the EU regulation is in line with requirements set out by international standards as
well as other domestic regulationshigh income countries mostly. Besides, the EU is a
major destination market for our African countriesexport. It makes sense to account
for requirements in this destination market. All together, this substantially supports our
8Although not optimal, this gives us some insight on how risk may evolve across sectors over time.
The number of alerts at the product level is correlated at 75% across all years between 2001 and 2008.
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claim that the risk index is the best available proxy for nancing needs at the product
level.9
Appendix 8:D provides a list of the CN2 agri-food sector associated with the highest
sanitary risk indices, both according to the number of "risky" productsproduct with a
positive Sanitary Risk Indexand the average sanitary risk. The table also gives the total
number of alerts for each sector between 2001 and 2005, as well as the most frequent
reason for rejection. Not surprisingly, shery products, spices emerge as the most "risky"
sectors, and thus, the sectors that use the most external nance. All together, 373 CN8
codes out of 2146 have a non zero risk index. In most cases, rejections are due to
contamination level above the authorised threshold in inspected products.
3.2 Trade Duration and Di¤erence in Di¤erence Approach
Our empirical strategy consists of incorporating the Rajan and Zingales (1998) method-
ology into the survival analysis framework. Our focus is on the long run survival of
products in foreign markets. We depart from previous works on nance and trade,
where the focus is on the short-term year-to-year changes in export status of products
or rms (Manova, 2008; Berman and Héricourt forth). Survival analysis is probably
the most suitable tool to study the impact of nancial development on the longer-term
exporting status of trade relationships. While our data is initially a four dimensional
panel data (we observe export by rm-destination country-product over time), we re-
duce the panel dimensions to three, to study the length of trade relationships. This
highly detailed level of information is particularly suitable for survival analysis as aggre-
gation may introduce considerable bias, essentially hiding failures. A trade relationship
is dened as a rm-product-destination triplet, and the duration of a trade relationship
is dened as the time (in years) a triplet has been in existence without interruption.
Our variable of interest is the survival-time of rms export relationshipsthe time until
a trade relationship endsacross products in ve African countries. Then, rms in our
sample are already surviving rms. They already incurred sunk entry costs. As a result,
our focus is on the determinants of their ability to continuously remain on and not to
enter in the market.
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) are not suitable for duration data, essentially because
survival-times are restricted to be positive, and thus, have a skewed distribution. There-
fore, we model the survival of trade relationships using a Cox proportional Hazard Model
(CPHM). We assume that the duration of exports of product k from rm i operating
9Since four of the ve African countries used in our analysis are also present in the food alert
database, this may introduce an endogeneity bias. All together Ghana, Mali, Malawi and Senegal
account for 2.6 percent of the food alerts, when an average exporter su¤ers around 90 alerts and an
average African exporter gets rejected 12 times on average. We re-estimated the risk index dropping
those four countries from the food alert database. The level of correlation between the actual and newly
computed risk index is 0.9.
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in country c to destination country j, depends upon a set of variables Xcikj: Speci-
cally, we model the hazard function of a trade relationship as a multiplicative function
between an unspecied time-dependent baseline hazard function, and an exponential
function of country and sector xed e¤ects, an interaction term between our measure of
risk with the level of nancial development, a set of controls and the unobserved e¤ects.
In the Cox PH model (Appendix 8:J), the inclusion of xed e¤ects, result in a shift of
the baseline hazard function. We further allow, for the shape of the baseline hazard
function h(t) to vary across productsHS8-digitby tting a stratied Cox PH model.
Stratication according to the product indicator variable k with 698 the number of
agri-food products, adds more exibility to the model and allows to estimate the e¤ect
of the Xcikj on the hazard rate within-product.
Thus, the empirical model we estimate is as follows:
h(tjXcikj; k = k) = hk(t) exp[FDc  sanitary_riskk
+Controlsckt0+i+j++ t0+"cikjt0 ] (2)
where FDc is the level of nancial development of country c, sanitary_riskk the risk
index of product k, i is a rm xed e¤ect, j is a destination country xed e¤ect,
 is an exporter  HS2 sector xed e¤ect10, and "cikj is an unobserved e¤ect. To
capture the di¤erential e¤ect of nancial development across products, we interact the
country level of nancial development with the product level of nancing needs (FDc 
sanitary_riskk) and control for product and country xed e¤ects. This allows to isolate
the impact of nancial development on product survival after controlling for omitted
variable bias at the country and product level. The level of nancial development is
taken at the initiation of the sample period for each exporting country11. That is
the year we rst have export data. All other explanatory variables take value at the
initiation of the trade relationship. Our vector of Controls includes various product
and rm characteristics as well as traditional bilateral gravity variables. The product-
related variables include the value of export in US dollars in the initial year of the trade
relationship in logs, initial_exportcikj. This reects the level of condence importers
have in the protability of their trading partner (Rauch and Watson, 2003; Albornoz
et al., 2010). Additionally, we include the total number of destination markets served
by rm i in country c with product k in the initial year of the trade relationship,
NDestinationscik, in log terms. This allows to control for the experience the rm has
in supplying the world market with product k. We control for the degree of export
10Sector is dened at HS2 level.
11We do this due to the short time span of our sample, and the poor reliability of the data for
African countries. Additionally, we used the average level of nancial development over the sample
period for each country, and nancial development measured at the beginning of each spell, results
remain qualitatively the same.
11
diversication for a given rm, incorporating the number of products exported by rm i
to the world market in the initial year of the trade relationship, NProductsci. Transport
costs are proxied with bilateral distance between origin country c and destination country
j in logs, Distancecj .12. We also include a dummy variable that equals one if importing
and exporting countries share a border, Contiguitycj. Bilateral trade can be fostered
by countriescultural proximity. Similarity in culture can indeed increase the quality
of the match between varieties produced in exporting country and tastes of consumers
in the destination country. We control for this proximity by introducing two dummies,
respectively equal to one if a language is spoken by at least 9% of the population in
both countries, Com_languagecj, or if both partners have had a colonial relationship,
Colonycj. Appendix 8:E provides summary statistics of the main variables used in our
analysis.
Equation (2) is estimated under partial likelihood (Cox, 1972). Since there may be
unobserved variation across exporter-sector pairsto avoid biasing the standard errors
downwardsin all tables we report robust standard errors clustered at the exporter-
sub-sector (HS4) level. The coe¢ cients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities, as they
measure the percentage point change in the hazard rate as a result of a unit change in
the right-hand side variables.
A common feature of survival data is censoring. First, we observe ows in the rst
year of our sample but do not know how long they have been in existence. Second,
we observe ows in the nal year of our sample but do no know how long they will
continue to exist. The problem of right-censoring is accounted for in the Cox estimation
procedures13. Left-censoring presents a more serious problem. Given the short time
span, our approach is simply to ignore left censoring in our main estimations. As a
robustness test, we drop all observations which are left-censored and determine the
sensitivity of our results to left-censoring14.
4 Data
4.1 African Firm Data
Our analysis relies on a novel dataset collected within the frame of the Export Survival
Project, implemented by the International Trade Department of the World Bank15.
The dataset combines rm level export data collected by customs authorities in ve
African reporting countriesGhana, Mali, Malawi, Senegal and Tanzania. The dataset
12Distances are calculated as the sum of the distances between the biggest cities of both countries,
weighted by the share of the population living in each city.
13Stata incudes a dummy variable taking vaue one if the spell is still existing the last year of the
sample.
14Results not reported, available upon request.
15We thank Denisse Pierola and Paul Brenton.
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provides trade ows for more than 5,000 HS 8-digit products16 to 253 countries, between
2000-200817. In the following, we consider only exports of agri-food products excluding
beverages, animal feed and tobacco. This corresponds to chapters 1 to 21 of the HS
classication, and restricts our sample to 845 product lines. Exports ows are reported
annually in values (US dollars) and quantities (tons). Among reporting rms almost
50% only appear once in the dataset. That is, they export only one product to one
destination one year. As such observations are likely to be mis-reports, we exclude them
from the analysis. Among these observations we nd a large proportion of individuals,
for example, "MR OMART FRANCOIS KOUBLANOU", "MR. JOHN AMEFU", or
inconsistent exports such as "AIRLINES GHANA LTD" exporting wood logs. Addi-
tionally, we exclude from the analysis exports ows from international organizations and
embassies, 3% of the observations, since such exports are not driven by prot motives
and might bias our results18. Finally, the data show that 3:5% of export ows are re-
alised by trading companies. Since our analysis focuses on agri-food products, for which
changing food safety regulation may impose additional production and or transaction
costs, we are concerned about producing rms. In a robustness test we drop observa-
tions from trading companies and estimate the sensitivity of our results to the exclusion
of these observations.
4.2 Additional Data Sources
The data on nancial development is taken from the Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine
(2006) database, which contains various indicators of nancial development across coun-
tries and over time. We use the private credit to GDP as a proxy for countrys nancial
depth. The variable ranges from 0:21 for Senegal in 2008 to 0:052 for Malawi in 2004.
The annual data for GDP per capita is taken from the World Development Indicator
report 2006, and is reported in constant 2000 US dollars. Financial development and
GDP per capita are correlated at 78% in our sample.
Additionally, we use the level of outstanding short-term credit (TCc) and trade credit
insurance (ICc) as reported in the Global Development Finance (GDF) as a share of
GDP, as proxies for trade nancing. Finally, as an alternative control for the countrys
quality of nancial systems, we use the Getting Credit Index (EGCc) from the World
Bank Doing Business Survey (WBDBS) data for the year 200419. The index ranks
countries according to the strength of legal rights and the depth of credit information.
16Since HS 8-digit product classications are country specic, we rst had to harmonise the classi-
cations among all countries. Then we match it with the CN 8-digit Eurostat classication, for which
the risk index is computed.
17Senegal reports data from 2000 till 2008; Mali from 2005 to 2008, Malawi and Ghana from 2004
till 2008; and Tanzania from 2003 till 2009.
18Including these exporters, results hold in a similar way. Results are available upon request.
19This is the only available year.
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We control for additional country characteristics. We use the Ease of Doing Business
index (EDBc) and the Trading Across Borders index (TABc) to control for the qual-
ity of the business environment in the exporting country. A countrys ranking on the
former is based on the average of ten subindicesincluding starting a business, dealing
with licenses, hiring and ring workers. More specically, the Trading Across Borders
index, captures the complexity of customs procedures faced by exporters. It accounts
for the number of documents, the number of signatures and time necessary to export
and import. The data for both indices is taken from the WBDBS. We use the Logis-
tics Performance Index as a proxy for exporting countrys capacity to e¢ ciently move
goods and connect with international markets (LPIc). The index is a weighted aver-
age of country scores on six key dimensionsincluding e¢ ciency of the clearance process,
competence and quality of logistics services, ease of arranging competitively priced ship-
ments. Additionally, we control for the quality of trade and transport infrastructures
using the Infrastructure Index which enters the overall LPI index. The data comes from
the World Bank Logistic Performance Indicator database for the year 200716 .
Product wise, we use a perishability index, to insure that our risk measure is not picking
up on other product characteristics that may a¤ect their survival. The index takes
value one if the product cannot be stored without refrigerator facilities, zero otherwise.
Perishable products typically include, meat, shery products, fruits and vegetables.
Correlation between our risk index and the perishability index is 0:15. Finally, data for
the gravity variables come from the CEPII database.
4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Appendix 8:F reports some statistics at the rm level for each exporting country.
"Risky" products account for an important share of rms total exports in all ve
countries. Additionally, "risky" rmsexporting at least one "risky" productrepresent
around half of the total rm population in all ve countries. Non "risky" rms are rms
that export no "risky" products at all. Appendices 8:G and 8:H report some statistics
for our survival data. Considering rms in all countries the average spell duration is
about one year and four months and the median duration is only one year. Almost 40%
of the spells are right censored, and 17% are left censored. Considering each country
individually, Senegal exhibits the highest average spell duration, and Ghana the lowest.
A large proportion of spells, 56%, start with trade values lower than 10000 dollars, 13%
are initiated with trade values higher than 100000 dollars and only 3% start with initial
trade values greater than 1000000 dollars. Dropping all spells with initial trade value
inferior to 10000 dollars (100000, or 1000000 dollars) increase (even more) the average
and median spell duration. The higher the initial trade value the higher the probability
to survive. These results are in line with ndings in previous empirical studies (Besedes
and Prusa, 2006a, 2006b).
We now move on to characterize the duration of trade relationships non paramet-
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rically, by estimating the survival function using the Kaplan-Meier estimator (see Ap-
pendix 8:I for technical details). We consider all countries and split products into two
groups according to their risk: agri-food products in the top 25th percentile of the risk
index distribution, the most "risky" products, and the rest of the product, the less
"risky" ones20. The survival functions for both products categories are presented in
Figure 1.
Figure 1: Survival of "Risky" versus "non Risky" Products, All Countries.
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As expected, the less "risky" products (risk=0) survive longer than the riskier ones
(risk=1). Tests on the equality of the survival functions reject the null hypothesis
at a 1% level of signicance (Appendix 8:I). The pattern remains unchanged if we
consider each country individually (not reported). Finally, we plot survival functions of
each risk category for Senegal and Tanzania, the countries with the highest and lowest
level of nancial developmentmeasured as the ratio of private credit to GDPin our
sample (Figure 2). Results suggest that "risky" products survive longer in Senegal where
nancial markets are relatively better developed, yielding support to our hypothesis.
20The split is dictated by the high proportion of zero risk products.
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Figure 2: Survival of "Risky" Products and Financial Development.
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5 Empirical Results
5.1 Trade Survival and Financial Development
Table 1 reports the e¤ect of nancial development on export survival for our baseline
specication incorporating various combinations of xed e¤ects. The dependent variable
is the probability of exiting destination country j for product k from rm i operating
in country c. Our main variable of interest is the interaction term between the Sanitary
Risk Index and the ratio of bank credits to GDP. The coe¢ cient on the interaction term
(FDcsanitary_riskk) captures the di¤erentiated e¤ect of nancial development across
products based on their need for external nance. In column (1) we estimate the direct
e¤ect of risk (sanitary_riskk) and nancial development (FDc) on the probability to
exit foreign markets. We stratify by HS4 to allow the hazard function to vary across
sub-sectors. In addition, we include destination market xed e¤ects as the ability to
survive may vary from one destination market to another. Year xed e¤ects account
for global shocks a¤ecting all trade relationships. We nd that "risky" products survive
signicantly less than non "risky" ones. The level of nancial development in country
c has a positive e¤ect on rmssurvival. Both coe¢ cients enter statistically signicant
at the 1% level.
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Table 1: Financial Development and Trade Survival.
The dependent variable is the hazard rate of trade relationships for product k of rm i
operating in country c to destination country j: All regressions are estimated using the
Cox Proportional Hazard Model and account for various stratication variables and xed
e¤ects. (See details for each column). The main variables of interest are sanitary risk
of product k (sanitary_riskk ) and its interaction with nancial development in country c
(FDc*sanitary_riskk). The control variables include nancial development of country c
(FDc), initial export value (initial_exportickj), number of products exported by rm i to
the world market (NProductsci), number of destination service by rm i with product k
(NDestinationscik), gravity variables (Contiguitycj,Com_languagecj,Colonycj, Distancecj).
Robust standard errors clustered at (exporting country)  HS4 sector level are in parenthe-
ses. *, **, and *** denote statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FDc x sanitary_riskk -0.141** -0.109* -0.263** -0.458*
(0.069) (0.066) (0.107) (0.252)
sanitary_riskk 0.018*** 0.015**
(0.007) (0.006)
FDc -3.557***
(0.726)
initial_exportcikj -0.075*** -0.094*** -0.088*** -0.096***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
NProductsci -0.003*** -0.003 -0.004** -0.009**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
NDestinationscik -0.024*** -0.060*** -0.057*** -0.065***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014)
Contiguitycj -0.087 -0.150 -0.190
(0.090) (0.105) (0.251)
Com_languagecj -0.249*** -0.126*** -0.123
(0.040) (0.040) (0.101)
Colonycj 0.123 -0.086 0.122
(0.089) (0.084) (0.197)
Distancecj 0.095** 0.090* 0.319**
(0.044) (0.049) (0.147)
rm fe no yes yes yes
destination fe yes no yes no
destination x exporter fe no yes no no
year fe yes yes yes yes
HS4 fe yes no no no
HS2 x exporting country fe no yes yes yes
HS8 strata no no yes no
HS8 x destination strata no no no yes
Observations 14870 14870 14870 14870
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Our variable of interest is negative and signicant at the 5% level, suggesting that nan-
cial development helps disproportionately more "risky" products to survive. In column
(2) we add rm xed e¤ects controlling for unobserved time invariant rm character-
istics. We stratify by HS2  exporter and allow the baseline hazard function to vary
across HS2-exporting country pair (69 pairs). In this way, we control for cross coun-
try di¤erences in specialisation patterns. We further control for possible bilateral aid
to trade programs that may inuence the survival of trade relationships, including im-
porter  exporter xed e¤ects. The e¤ect of nancial development alone is absorbed.
The coe¢ cient on the risk index remains positive and statistically signicant. The co-
e¢ cient on the interaction term is negative and signicant at the 10%. In column (3)
we include a product (HS 8-digit) xed e¤ect to control for any product time invariant
characteristics. The coe¢ cient on risk alone is absorbed. The coe¢ cient on our interac-
tion term remains negative and strongly signicant. This specication is the closest to
the original Rajan and Zingales methodology, and therefore, our preferred. We use it for
all subsequent robustness checks unless specied otherwise. Finally, in the last column
of Table 1, we estimate an even more rigorous specication, including HS8  destina-
tion xed e¤ects. The inclusion of HS8 x destination e¤ects controls for unobservable
protectionist measures that may impact the ability of rms to survive. Additionally, it
controls for the market structure for a given product in a given destination that may
inuence the survival of risky agri-food products. The coe¢ cient on our main variable
is negative and signicant at the 10% level.
Moving to our control variables, the value of export (initial_exportcikj), and the total
number of product to all destination markets (NProductsci) and the total number of
destination served with product k (NDestinationscik), in the initial year of export spell
all decrease the hazard rate. Intuitively, products survive longer on the export market
when the importers are willing to accept a higher initial shipment and when the ex-
porting company has experience with exporting and with placing the products in other
markets as well. Distance as a proxy for trade costs increases the hazard rate. While
sharing a common border, colonial links and a common language decrease the hazard
rate. All in all, the coe¢ cient on our variable of interest (FDc  sanitary_riskk)
is negative and signicant for all specications, suggesting that domestic nancial de-
velopment increases survival of "risky" products in foreign markets. The magnitude
and signicance on the interaction term is a¤ected by the choice of xed e¤ects and
stratication variable. The coe¢ cient varies from  0:45, when controlling for HS8 
destination country xed e¤ects, to  0:10 when controlling for HS2  origin country
xed e¤ects. One way to get a sense of the magnitude of the e¤ect is as follows. In
2003, Senegals ratio of private credit to GDP is about 0.145%, Tanzanias ratio of pri-
vate credit to GDP is about 0.051%. We consider "Shrimps" with an associated risk
index of 2; 97. The coe¢ cient of the interaction term between nancial development and
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our risk index is -0.264 in our preferred specication. Therefore, if Tanzanias level of
nancial development reached Senegals, then the hazard rate of shrimps exports would
decrease by  Risk FinDev =  0:264  2:97  (0:145  0:051)  7%.
6 Robustness Checks
6.1 Alternative Measures of Financial Development
In Table 2 we report results using alternative measures of risk (column 2) and nancial
development (column 3 to 5). Column (1) reports our preferred baseline specica-
tion for the sake of comparison. In column (2) we use an alternative measure of risk
(alt_sanitary_riskk)constructed by Jaud and al (2009a) using a Poisson model in-
stead of a Negative Binomial. Results remain qualitatively the same21. Column (3)
and (4) report results using alternative measures of access to nancing. Local nancial
markets are not the only source of nance for exporters.
Firms operating in countries with poorly developed nancial markets may rely on trade
nancing provided by institutions in the destination country. The interaction term
between our risk index and the measure of short term credit from the BIS banks (TCc)
is negative and statistically signicant at the 10% level. The coe¢ cient is negative but
not signicant when using the ratio of trade insurance to GDP (ICc) interacted with
risk. Column (5) reports results when using the Ease of Getting Credit index (EGCc):
The coe¢ cient on the interaction term with the risk index comes out negative and
signicant at the 5% level, suggesting that the quality of domestic nancial institution
increases survival of "risky" products in foreign markets.
21Alternatively, we use the count of notications per product at the HS 6-digit level, as a measure of
nancing needs. The data is taken from Didiers and al. (2008). The correlation between our measure
of risk and this alternative measure is 0.05. Coe¢ cients on both the count of notications and its
interaction with the level of nancial development are of expected sign but not signicant.
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Table 2: Robustness I, Survival and Alternative Measures of Financial Development.
The dependent variable is the hazard rate of trade relationships for product k of rm i operating in
country c to destination country j: All regressions are estimated using the Cox Proportional Hazard
Model. We control for destination country, year, rm and exporting country x HS2 xed e¤ects,
and allow the baseline hazard to vary across HS8 product (strata). The variables of interest are
dened in Table 1. Additional controls include an alternative measure of sanitary risk, the sanitary
risk index computed using Poisson regression (alt_sanitary_riskk, see Jaud et al.,2009a). We
use as alternative measures of nancial development proxied by trade credit over GDP in country
c (TCc), by trade credit insurance over GDP in country c (ICc) and by the Ease of Getting Credit
index (EGCc). Robust standard errors clustered at (exporting country)  HS4 sector level are
in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FDc x sanitary_riskk -0.263**
(0.106)
initial_exportcikj -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.089*** -0.089***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
NProductsci -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
NDestinationscik -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.056***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Contiguitycj -0.150 -0.151 -0.147 -0.147 -0.150
(0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) (0.104)
Com_languagecj -0.126*** -0.126*** -0.126*** -0.126*** -0.126***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Colonycj -0.086 -0.086 -0.093 -0.094 -0.086
(0.084) (0.084) (0.085) (0.085) (0.084)
Distancecj 0.090* 0.089* 0.092* 0.090* 0.089*
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
FDc x alt_sanitary_riskk -0.202**
(0.088)
TCc x sanitary_riskk -0.118*
(0.062)
ICc x sanitary_riskk -0.138
(0.120)
EGCc x sanitary_riskk -0.0003**
(0.0001)
Observations 14870 14870 14870 14870 14870
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6.2 Controlling for Alternative Channels
As in standard OLS, the identication of our main coe¢ cient relies on the assumption of
orthogonality between the interaction term and the residual. We are concerned with vari-
able potentially correlated with nancial development and that may impact the survival
of products di¤erentially. Financial development may be correlated with other country
characteristics, such as the quality of the infrastructure, the complexity of the customs
procedures, the business regulations etc... In order to control for these alternative chan-
nels, we interact each of these country variables with the risk index and include them as
additional regressors in our baseline specication (column (3) in Table 1). Results are
reported in Table 3: The coe¢ cient on our main variable (FDcsanitary_riskk) has ex-
pected sign and remains signicant in all specications. The coe¢ cient of the interaction
term between the Sanitary Risk Index and GPD per capita , is positive and signicant at
the 5% level. This, most probably, signals a colinearity problem between both interac-
tion terms (column 1)22. In column (2) we interact the Ease of Doing Business index with
the risk index (EDBc  sanitary_riskk), controling for favourable business conditions
in the exporting country that may positively inuence exports survival. The coe¢ cient
is positive but not signicant. Column (3), (4) and (5) report results when controlling
for respectively, Logistic Performance Index (LPIc  sanitary_riskk), the quality of
the trading infrastructure (Infrustructurec  sanitary_riskk), and the complexity of
trading procedures in the exporting country (TABc  sanitary_riskk): Coe¢ cients on
all three interaction terms have expected signs but fail to be statistically signicant,
while the coe¢ cient on the interaction of FCc with sanitary_riskk remains negative
and signicant23. All in all, after controlling for overall economic development, quality
of the business and trading environment, the positive e¤ect of access to nance on rms
exports survival remains. These ndings yield further support to our hypothesis.
22We run a regression with the interaction term of GDP per capita with risk alone. The coe¢ cient is
negative and signicant at the 5% level. This suggests that the overall level of economic development
act in a similar way as nancial development.
23Running separate regressions with the interaction term of each of these variables with risk alone,
the coe¢ cients are of expected sign and statistically signicant.
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Table 3: Robustness II, Survival and Institutional Development.
The dependent variable is the hazard rate of trade relationships for product k of rm i operating
in country c to destination country j: All regressions are estimated using the Cox Proportional
Hazard Model. We control for destination country, year, rm and exporting country x HS2 xed
e¤ects, and allow the baseline hazard to vary across HS8 product (strata). The variables of
interest are dened in Table 1. Additional controls include the interaction between the sanitary
risk and : country c overall economic development (GDPpcc x sanitary_riskc), country c Ease
of Doing Business index (EDBcx sanitary_riskc ), country c Logistic Performance index (LPIcx
sanitary_riskc), country c level of infrastructure (Infrustructurecx sanitary_riskc), and country
c level of trade related infrustructure (TABcx sanitary_riskc). Robust standard errors clustered
at (exporting country)  HS4 sector level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FDcx sanitary_riskk -0.590** -0.257** -0.291** -0.169* -0.345***
(0.243) (0.099) (0.146) (0.101) (0.130)
initial_exportcikj -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.088***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
NProductsci -0.004* -0.004** -0.004** -0.004* -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
NDestinationscik -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.056*** -0.057*** -0.057***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Contiguitycj -0.150 -0.149 -0.150 -0.148 -0.151
(0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104)
Com_languagecj -0.125*** -0.126*** -0.126*** -0.125*** -0.125***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
Colonycj -0.089 -0.088 -0.086 -0.089 -0.087
(0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084)
Distancecj 0.090* 0.091* 0.090* 0.091* 0.089*
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
GDPpcc x sanitary_riskk 0.00016*
(0.0001)
EDBc x sanitary_riskk 0.0001
(0.0001)
LPIc x sanitary_riskk 0.0120
(0.036)
Infrastructurecx sanitary_riskk -0.052
(0.033)
TABc x sanitary_riskk -0.0007
(0.0005)
Observations 14870 14870 14870 14870 14870
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6.3 Destination Markets Demand for Quality
In this section we provide evidence that the risk index, while computed using the EU
food safety regulations as a benchmark, does not capture specicities of the EU market
only (Table 4). Columns with odd numbers report results when controlling for rm
destination and year xed e¤ects and stratifying across HS4. This allows us to recover
the main e¤ect of the risk index. Columns with even numbers report results under our
preferred specication (column (3) in Table 1). Destination markets are: non European
countries only (column 1-2), high income countries only (column 3-4), low income coun-
tries only (column 5-6), and nally African countries only (column 7-8). First, results
indicate that the risk index is not specic to the EU market. The coe¢ cient on our in-
teraction term (FDc sanitary_riskk) is negative and signicant at the 1% level when
excluding EU countries from the sample (column 1-2). Second, the coe¢ cients on risk
and its interaction with nancial development are not signicant when considering low
income or African countries only as destination markets. Suggesting that food safety
matters solely for developed countries, restricting the role of nancial development for
those markets only. Precisely, it reects the stronger concerns of developed economies
for human health and food safety issues. Such results nd support in the trade and qual-
ity literature. Hallak (2006) nds some evidence that richer countries have relatively
greater demand for high quality goodsquality being measured by unit values.
6.4 Survival and FirmsType
Among exporting rms 17% export to African markets only. Obviously, such rms
face very di¤erent food safety requirements in comparison to rms servicing developed
countries. We re-estimate our main specication considering rms that export only to
Africa. The level of nancial development does not seem to matter for rms that only
export to the African region (column 1 in Table 5). Yet, it does for rms that export
to other regions. In column (2) we rerun estimation dropping rms that export only
to Africa from the total rms sample. The coe¢ cient on our interaction term after
dropping the "only-Africa" exporters increases nearly twofold in magnitude (from to
 0:26 to  0:46). Additionally, there is evidence of capital ows from multinational rm
to a¢ liates as potential channels to overcome imperfections in local capital markets
(Desai, Folay and Hines, 2009).
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Yet, our index does not account for trade nancing associated with intra-rm trade by
multinational corporations or trade related to foreign direct investment. Additionally,
large trading companies may enjoy facilitated access to trade credit. To insure our
results are not driven by multinationals or large trading companies24, we alternatively
drop them from our sample and re-estimate our preferred specication. Results are
reported in column (3) and (4) and show that this is not the case. Finally, rms
exhibiting multiple-spell trade relationships25 may spread the investment and operating
costs, to come to compliance with food safety requirements, over di¤erent spells. We
drop observations corresponding to higher order spells from our sample. Column (5)
show that our results remain the same.
6.5 Perishable versus "Risky" Products
Lastly, to insure that the risk index is not picking up on other product characteristics
that may a¤ect their survival, we include as a control variable, a perishability index
(perishablek). We expect perishable productsthat cannot be stored without refrigerator
facilitiesto survive less. We interact nancial development with the perishability index
(FDc  perishablek) and include it in place of our main interaction term. Column (1)
and (2) in Table 6, report results controlling for rm destination and year xed e¤ects
and stratifying across HS4. In column (3) and (4) we stratify across HS8. Perishable
products survive less (column 1). However, the level of nancial development does not
seem to matter. After controlling for the perishable nature of product, the coe¢ cients
on risk and risk interacted with nancial development remain signicant and of expected
signs26.
24We identify multinational companies based on their names; for example "NESTLE", or "COL-
GATE" are identied as multinationals. Trading companies are identied using search for keywords in
the rm names; for example "EXPORT TRADING CO. LTD."
25If a rm x destination x product triplet enters more than once in the dataset, we say it exhibits
multiple spells of service.
26The correlation between our risk measure and the perishability index is 0.13 .
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Table 5: Robustness IV, Survival and FirmsType.
The dependent variable is the hazard rate of trade relationships for product k of rm i operating
in country c to destination country j: All regressions are estimated using the Cox Proportional
Hazard Model. We control for destination country, year, rm and exporting country x HS2 xed
e¤ects, and allow the baseline hazard to vary across HS8. Sample description: rms only exporting
to African countries (column 1), total sample excuding rms only exporting to African countries
(column 2), total sample excuding trading and international companies (columns 3-4), and total
sample excuding higher order spells (column 7). Robust standard errors clustered at (exporting
country)  HS4 sector level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical signicance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firms Firms No No rst
exporting to exporting to international trading spell
Africa only di¤erent regions companies companies only
FDc x sanitary_riskk 0.018 -0.461*** -0.243** -0.235** -0.237**
(0.142) (0.151) (0.108) (0.107) (0.118)
initial_exportcikj -0.087*** -0.094*** -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.093***
(0.015) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
NProductsci 0.010*** -0.016*** -0.004 -0.002 -0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
NDestinationscik -0.033*** -0.046*** -0.057*** -0.060*** -0.055***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Contiguitycj -0.085 -0.204 -0.086 -0.152 -0.110
(0.155) (0.170) (0.125) (0.109) (0.102)
Com_languagecj -0.225*** -0.074 -0.072 -0.124*** -0.113***
(0.065) (0.048) (0.045) (0.044) (0.043)
Colonycj -0.123 -0.166** -0.076 -0.103
(0.088) (0.083) (0.085) (0.104)
Distancecj 0.109 0.066 0.141*** 0.085* 0.121***
(0.084) (0.064) (0.052) (0.050) (0.047)
Observations 2494 12376 14163 13522 13191
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Table 6: Robustness V, Survival Sanitary Risk and Product Perishability.
The dependent variable is the hazard rate of trade relationships for product k of rm i
operating in country c to destination country j: All regressions are estimated using the Cox
Proportional Hazard Model. We control for destination country, year, rm and exporting
country x HS2 xed e¤ects, and allow the baseline hazard to vary across HS4 (columns 1-2)
and across HS8 (columns 3-4). We control for alternative product characteristics, their per-
ishability (perishabilityk). We interact the level of nancial development in country c with
tthe perishability index (FDcperishabilityk). In addition we include number of non EU
partners to control for altrenative markets where exporters can sell their products. Robust
standard errors clustered at (exporting country)  HS4 sector level are in parentheses. *,
**, and *** denote statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FDc x sanitary_riskk -0.154** -0.263**
(0.073) (0.108)
FDc x perishablek -0.537 -0.321 0.703 0.978
(0.897) (0.890) (0.927) (0.915)
sanitary_riskk 0.020***
(0.007)
perishablek 0.296** 0.279**
(0.135) (0.131)
initial_exportcikj -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.089*** -0.088***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
NProductsi -0.003 -0.003 -0.004** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
NDestinationscik -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.056*** -0.056***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
NPartn_nonEUcik -0.168395* -0.172531* -0.148588 -0.150
(0.098) (0.098) (0.104) (0.103)
Com_languagecj -0.115*** -0.114*** -0.129*** -0.129***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Colonycj -0.151* -0.148* -0.088 -0.083
(0.083) (0.083) (0.085) (0.084)
Distancecj 0.043 0.043 0.090* 0.091*
(0.043) (0.044) (0.048) (0.048)
Observations 14870 14870 14870 14870
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7 Concluding Remarks
This paper documents the importance of access to nance in determining the survival of
agri-food products sensitive to food safety regulations in destination markets. We com-
bine the econometric framework of survival analysis with the methodology introduced
by Rajan and Zingales (1998). Our novelty stands in the use of a measure of product
sanitary risk (Jaud et al., 2009a) as a proxy for the reliance of agri-food exportrs on
external nancing. The Sanitary Risk Index (Jaud et al., 2009a) is computed at the
8-digit level of the CN classication. It reects the propensity of products to fail safety
and health controls, and thus, captures the demand for nancing to comply with food
safety regulations at the product level.
Our paper provides strong evidence for a selective role of nance in promoting exports
survival. The increased availability of nance helps disproportionately more exports
of food products that require nancing to keep up with food safety regulations. A
well-developed nancial market can thus promotes export survival of high-value food
products. Additionally, our results suggest that food safety mostly matters for developed
countries, restricting the role of nancial development to those markets.
These ndings are particularly relevant for developing countries for whom access to
international markets for high-value food products is a mean to achieve higher economic
growth. Policy makers may focus on addressing credit failures and enabling nancial
development to allow for higher export performances. In addition, our results point
out an alternative route for rms unable to cope with stringent developed markets
regulations. The less stringent requirements that rule regional trade o¤er an opportunity
for rms to expand and grow stronger before they make the investments needed to service
the EU or US markets.
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8 Appendices
8.A Average Export Share by Region (% in an average year).
Variables Ghana Mali Malawi Senegal Tanzania
Africa 2 71 51 52 19
America 15 0 4 1 4
Asia 15 6 8 3 34
Europe 72 24 34 46 43
Pacic 0 0 0 0 1
8.B Micro Costs of Global GAP ComplianceTanzania.
GlobalGAP Requirements Set Up Costs (US$) On Going Costs (US$)
1 Traceability 4300 100
2 Record keeping and self-inspection 6000 3600
3 Site management 900 0
4 Risk assessments 1500 300
5 Technical services 0 2000
6 Laboratory analysis 0 3000
7 Soil and substrate management 1000 100
8 Fertilizer use 2500 750
9 Crop protection 10400 1250
10 Irrigation/fertilization 600 0
11 Harvesting 9800 200
12 Produce handling 11300 100
13 Waste & pollution management 800 50
14 Worker health, safety and welfare 47490 4250
15 Environmental issues 1100 200
16 Certication costs 1000 2000
17 GlobalGAP procedures 0 2600
Total costs 98690 20500
8.C Correlation Matrix.
Alerts Sanitary SPS
Risk Index Notications
Alerts* 1
Sanitary Risk Index 0.2347 1
SPS Notications* 0.0113 0.0123 1
*Total number over the period 2001-2005
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8.D The Sanitary Risk Index (SRI), at the CN2 level.
Description # Sanitary # Most frequent
"risky" Risk Index Alerts cause for rejection
products (SRI)* 2001-05
Co¤ee, tea, 38 2.07 934 Composition
mate and spices Mycotoxins
Preparations of meat & sh 32 1.29 309 Residues drugs
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits 25 1.04 1491 Mycotoxins
Fish, crustaceans & molluscs 108 0.95 2641 Residues drugs
Miscellaneous edible 7 0.85 185 Food additives
preparations
Edible fruit and nuts 53 0.71 3210 Mycotoxins
Edible vegetables 27 0.65 441 Pesticide residues
Cocoa and cocoa prep. 4 0.57 20 Allergens
Preparations of vegetables 44 0.54 677 Mycotoxins
fruit or nuts
Sugars 5 0.49 221 Food additives
and sugar Co Mycotoxins
Products of animal origin, nes 3 0.48 40 Residues drugs
Meat and edible meat o¤al 17 0.24 498 Pathogens
Animal or vegetable 7 0.18 247 Composition
fats and oils
Preparations of cereals 2 0.16 167 Radiation
Dairy produce 0 0.03 367 Residues drugs
Live animals 0 0 1 Heavy metals
Live trees and other plants 0 0 3
Cereals 0 0 158 GMO/mycotoxins
Products of the 0 0 36 Food additives
milling industry
Lac 0 0 1 Food additives
Vegetable plaiting materials 1 0 1 Labelling incorrect
"Risky" products are products with a positive Sanitary Risk Index. Out of a total of
2146 CN8 products, 373 are "risky" products. In column (3) we compute the Sanitary
Risk Index at the CN2 level, taking the average over all CN8 product in each CN2 sector.
Column (4) reports the total number of alerts per CN2 sector, over the period 2001-2005.
The last column details the most frequent cause for an alert.
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8.E Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Nber of product 14870 28.1 31.6 1 137
Nber of dest 14870 14.3 12.6 1 54
Distance 14870 8.3 0.89 5.04 9.6
Fin_Dev 14870 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.18
GDPpc 14870 369.7 59.1 194.4 510
Insured_credit 14870 0.11 0.027 0.033 0.13
Trade_credit 14870 0.18 0.06 0.055 0.23
Risk 14870 2.71 4.24 0 21.6
LPI 14870 2.16 0.08 2.08 2.42
Infrastructure 14870 2.16 0.11 1.9 2.25
Ease of Doing Business 14870 104.7 23 87 166
Ease of Getting Credit 14870 104.7 16.8 84 145
Trading Across Borders 14870 20.6 4.6 14 45
Fin_Dev  Risk 14870 0.27 0.46 0 3.13
GDPpc  Risk 14870 1027 1669 0 11039
Insured_credit  Risk 14870 0.3 0.48 0 2.78
Trade_credit  Risk 14870 0.5 0.87 0 5.04
LPI  Risk 14870 5.8 9.2 0 51.2
Infrastructure  Risk 14870 5.9 9.3 0 48.6
Ease of Doing Business  Risk 14870 280.6 453.1 0 3222
Ease of Getting Credit  Risk 14870 290.4 472.8 0 3136
Trading_Across_Borders  Risk 14870 54.1 84.2 0 950
Export 14870 8.5 2.9 -6.94 20.21
Descriptive Statistics
8.F Riskiness of Countrys Export.
Country Average rm in an average year
Total Nbr Export Total Share of Nbr Nbr
nbr "risky" "risky" products Export "risky" "safe" "risky"
products products (000$) (000$) exports rms rms
GHA 4 2 276009 2663712 45% 760 581
MLI 2 2 138172 224918 61% 46 20
MWI 2 2 254607 1025106 65% 75 36
SEN 3 2 422751 893963 65% 122 83
TZA 2 2 692777 1931762 52% 331 145
A safe rm is a rm that export no "risky" products at all. A "risky" rm is a rm exporting at
least one "risky" product.
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8.G Survival Database, Spell Duration, All Countries
failure d:died==1
analysis timet:(spellend-origin)
origin:time spellbegin
id:index
Category Total Mean Min Median Max
no. of subjects 14870
no. of records 14870 1 1 1 1
(rst) entry time 0 0 0 0
(nal) exit time 1.36 1 1 9
subjects with gap 0
time on gap if gap 0 . . . .
time at risk 20336 1.36 1 1 9
failures 8479 0.57 0 1 1
8.H Survival Database, Spell Duration, by County.
Country Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GHA 9074 1.20 0.63 1 5
MLI 63 1.38 0.58 1 3
MWI 301 1.62 1.00 1 4
SEN 1262 1.72 1.42 1 9
TZA 4170 1.60 1.17 1 7
Length of the spell
Initial Export value (USD) Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Export<1000 4615 1.17 0.56 1 7
1000 Export <10000 3723 1.30 0.79 1 9
10000Export<100000 4107 1.39 0.96 1 9
100000Export<1000000 1970 1.71 1.30 1 9
1000000 Export 455 2.08 1.63 1 9
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8.I Kaplan-Meier Estimates of Survival Functions.
In discrete time, the survivor function is dened as the probability that an individual
survives at least to time t:
S(t) = P (T  t) t = 1; 2; :::
The Kaplan-Meier estimator of the survivor function at time t is dened as:
^
S(t) = 
tit
[ni   di=ni]
where ti, i = 1; 2::: is the ordered failure times, ni denotes the number of spells alive
(at risk) just before time ti, including those who will die at time ti. Let di denote the
number of failures (deaths) at time ti27.
Test on Equality of Survival Functions
Chi2 (1) Pr>chi2 Null Hypothesis
on Equality Survival Functions
Cox regression-based test 24.87 0 rejected at 1%
Wilcoxon (Breslow) test 28.28 0 rejected at 1%
Tarone-Ware test 34.3 0 rejected at 1%
Log-rank test 47.87 0 rejected at 1%
8.J The Cox Proportional Hazard Model
Our approach utilizes a survival-analysis framework, and focuses on the duration of
trade relationships. Survival analysis allows to examine the relationship between the
survival-times distribution and some covariates of interest. The survival function gives
the probability that a trade relationship will survive past time t. Conversely, the haz-
ard function, h(t), assesses the instantaneous risk of demise at time t, conditional on
survival till that time. Formally, let T  0, denote the survival-time (length) of a trade
relationship, with covariates X, then the hazard rate h(t), is given by:
h(tjX) = lim
t!0
Pr[(t  T < t+t)jT  t;X]
t
In discrete times,
h(tjX) = Pr(T = tjT  t;X); t = 1; 2; :::
We estimate the hazard rate for our trade relationships data, using a Cox Propor-
tional Hazard (PH) model (introduced in a seminal paper by Cox, 1972 ). The Cox PH
model, is broadly applicable and the most widely used method for survival analysis.
The hazard function for a given rm  destination  product triplet with covariates
X = fx1; x2; :::xj; ::xng :
27The conditional probability that a spell dies in the time interval from ti   to ti, given survival
up to time ti   , is estimated as dini : The conditional probability that a spell survives beyond ti  
, given survival up to time ti    , is estimated as ni dini : In the limit as  ! 0, ni dini becomes an
estimate of the conditional probability of surviving beyond ti given survival up to ti.
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h(t j X) = h0(t) exp (X:)
is dened as the product of a baseline hazard function, h0(t), common to all observations
and a parametrised function exp (X:) with a vector of parameters : The form of the
baseline hazard function characterizes how the hazard changes as a function of time at
risk t, only. The covariates X a¤ect the hazard rate independently of time. The model
o¤ers some convenient features. It makes no assumptions about the form of the under-
lying baseline function. Additionally the relationship between the covariates and the
hazard rate is log-linear, allowing for a straightforward interpretation of the parameters.
Increasing xj by 1, all other covariates held constant, a¤ect the hazard function by a
factor of exp(j) at all points in time it shifts all points of the baseline hazard by the
same factor. Parameters estimates in the Cox PH model are obtained by maximizing the
partial likelihood as opposed to the likelihood for an entirely specied parametric haz-
ard model (Cox, 1972). Resulting estimates are not as e¢ cient as maximum-likelihood
estimates, however no arbitrary, and possibly incorrect, assumptions about the form of
the baseline hazard are made.
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